Tomorrow, former IAEA Director Mohamed Elbaradei moves from Vienna to Egypt, where many want to see him run for the Presidency in future elections (a tough hill to climb given a million barriers). Elbaradei himself has stated he is interested if genuinely open, free elections were constructed.
The new IAEA Director, Yukiya Amano, has issued one of the first Iran related reports in his tenure — and it’s style of presentation seems more technocratic to me.
Nonetheless, a new report that is being circulated privately and which has come my way is titled “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran”.
Here is a pdf of the report.
And here are the conclusions:
46. While the Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran, Iran has not provided the necessary cooperation to permit the Agency to confirm that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities.
47. Iran is not implementing the requirements contained in the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, including implementation of the Additional Protocol, which are essential to building confidence in the exclusively peaceful purpose of its nuclear programme and to resolve outstanding questions. In particular, Iran needs to cooperate in clarifying outstanding issues which give rise to concerns about possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme, and to
GOV/2010/10 Page 10 implement the modified text of Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part on the early provision of design information.
48. Contrary to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran has continued with the operation of PFEP and FEP at Natanz, and the construction of a new enrichment plant at Fordow. Iran has also announced the intention to build ten new enrichment plants. Iran recently began feeding low enriched UF6 produced at FEP into one cascade of PFEP with the aim of enriching it up to 20% in U-235. The period of notice provided by Iran regarding related changes made to PFEP was insufficient for the Agency to adjust the existing safeguards procedures before Iran started to feed the material into PFEP. The Agency’s work to verify FFEP and to understand the original purpose of the facility and the chronology of its design and construction remain ongoing. Iran is not providing access to information such as the original design documentation for FFEP or access to companies involved in the design and construction of the plant.
49. Contrary to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran has also continued with the construction of the IR-40 reactor and related heavy water activities. The Agency has not been permitted to take samples of the heavy water which is stored at UCF, and has not been provided with access to the Heavy Water Production Plant.
50. The Director General requests Iran to take steps towards the full implementation of its Safeguards Agreement and its other obligations, including the implementation of its Additional Protocol.
51. The Director General will continue to report as appropriate.
Bottom line is not surprising: Iran remains in non-compliance and will be a complex challenge.
— Steve Clemons
Update: Here is the latest AP story on this report which highlights concerns that Iran may be working on military applications of its nuclear program.